Difference between revisions of "Template:Soviet policies which encouraged adultery"

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After the Soviet Revolution, the Bolsheviks intervened more directly in domestic life. The new Code on Marriage and the Family (1918) established a legislative framework that clearly aimed to breakdown the traditional family. It removed the influence of the Church from marriage and divorce, making both a process of simple registration with the state. It granted the same legal rights to de facto marriages (couples living together) as it gave to legal marriages. The Code turned divorce from a luxury for the rich to something that was easy and affordable for all. The result was a huge increase in casual marriages and the highest rate of divorce in the world – three times higher than in France or Germany and twenty-six times higher than in England by 1926 – as the collapse of the Christian patriarchal order and the chaos of the revolutionary years loosened sexual morals along with family and communal ties.<ref>Wendy Z. Goldman. 1993.  Women, the State and Revolution: Soviet Family Policy and Social Life, 1917–1936. Cambridge. 107</ref><ref>Natalia Lebina. 1999. Povsednevnaia zhizn’sovetskogo goroda: normy i anomalii, 1920–1930 gody. St Petersburg. 272.</ref>
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After the Soviet Revolution, the Bolsheviks intervened more directly in domestic life. The new Code on Marriage and the Family (1918) established a legislative framework that clearly aimed to breakdown the traditional family. It removed the influence of the Church from marriage and divorce, making both a process of simple registration with the state. It granted the same legal rights to de facto marriages (couples living together) as it gave to legal marriages. The Code turned divorce from a luxury for the rich to something that was easy and affordable for all. The result was a huge increase in casual marriages and the highest rate of divorce in the world – three times higher than in France or Germany and twenty-six times higher than in England by 1926 – as the collapse of the Christian patriarchal order and the chaos of the revolutionary years loosened sexual morals along with family and communal ties.<ref>Wendy Z. Goldman. (1993).  Women, the State and Revolution: Soviet Family Policy and Social Life, 1917–1936. Cambridge. 107</ref><ref>Natalia Lebina. 1999. Povsednevnaia zhizn’sovetskogo goroda: normy i anomalii, 1920–1930 gody. St Petersburg. 272.</ref>
  
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In the early years of Soviet power, family breakdown was so common among revolutionary activists that it almost constituted an occupational hazard. Casual relationships were practically the norm in Bolshevik circles during the Civil War, when any comrade could be sent at a moment’s notice to some distant sector of the front. Such relaxed attitudes remained common throughout the 1920s, as Party activists and their young emulators in the Komsomol (Communist Youth League) were taught to put their commitment to the proletariat before romantic love or family. Sexual promiscuity was more pronounced in the Party’s youthful ranks than among Soviet youth in general. Many Bolsheviks regarded sexual license as a form of liberation from bourgeois moral conventions and as a sign of ‘Soviet modernity’. Some even advocated promiscuity as a way to counteract the formation of coupling relationships that separated lovers from the collective and detracted from their loyalty to the Party.<ref>Igal  Halfin. 2002. Intimacy in an Ideological Key: The Communist Case of the 1920s and 1930s’, in  Language and Revolution: Making Modern Political Identities. London. 187–188.</ref>
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In the early years of Soviet power, family breakdown was so common among revolutionary activists that it almost constituted an occupational hazard. Casual relationships were practically the norm in Bolshevik circles during the Civil War, when any comrade could be sent at a moment’s notice to some distant sector of the front. Such relaxed attitudes remained common throughout the 1920s, as Party activists and their young emulators in the Komsomol (Communist Youth League) were taught to put their commitment to the proletariat before romantic love or family. Sexual promiscuity was more pronounced in the Party’s youthful ranks than among Soviet youth in general. Many Bolsheviks regarded sexual license as a form of liberation from bourgeois moral conventions and as a sign of ‘Soviet modernity’. Some even advocated promiscuity as a way to counteract the formation of coupling relationships that separated lovers from the collective and detracted from their loyalty to the Party.<ref>Igal  Halfin. (2002). Intimacy in an Ideological Key: The Communist Case of the 1920s and 1930s’, in  Language and Revolution: Making Modern Political Identities. London. 187–188.</ref>
  
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It was a commonplace that the Bolshevik made a bad husband and father because the demands of the Party took him away from the home. ‘We Communists don’t know our own families,’ remarked one Moscow Bolshevik. ‘You leave early and come home late. You seldom see your wife and almost never see your children.’ At Party congresses, where the issue was discussed throughout the 1920s, it was recognized that Bolsheviks were far more likely than non-Party husbands to abandon wives and families, and that this had much to do with the primacy of Party loyalties over sexual fidelity. But in fact the problem of absent wives and mothers was almost as acute in Party circles, as indeed it was in the broader circles of the Soviet intelligentsia, where most women were involved in the public sphere.15<ref> Orlando Figes. (2008).  The Whisperers: Private Life in Stalin's Russia. Picador.</ref><ref>Leon Trotsky. 1973. Problems of Everyday Life: Creating the Foundations of a New Society in Revolutionary Russia. London. 72</ref><ref>Alex  Inkeles & Raymond Augustine Bauer. 1959. The Soviet Citizen: Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society. Cambridge, Mass. 205.</ref>
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It was a commonplace that the Bolshevik made a bad husband and father because the demands of the Party took him away from the home. ‘We Communists don’t know our own families,’ remarked one Moscow Bolshevik. ‘You leave early and come home late. You seldom see your wife and almost never see your children.’ At Party congresses, where the issue was discussed throughout the 1920s, it was recognized that Bolsheviks were far more likely than non-Party husbands to abandon wives and families, and that this had much to do with the primacy of Party loyalties over sexual fidelity. But in fact the problem of absent wives and mothers was almost as acute in Party circles, as indeed it was in the broader circles of the Soviet intelligentsia, where most women were involved in the public sphere.15<ref> Orlando Figes. (2008).  The Whisperers: Private Life in Stalin's Russia. Picador.</ref><ref>Leon Trotsky. 1973. Problems of Everyday Life: Creating the Foundations of a New Society in Revolutionary Russia. London. 72</ref><ref>Alex  Inkeles & Raymond Augustine Bauer. (1959). The Soviet Citizen: Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society. Cambridge, Mass. 205.</ref>
  
 
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Revision as of 21:58, 21 February 2021

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After the Soviet Revolution, the Bolsheviks intervened more directly in domestic life. The new Code on Marriage and the Family (1918) established a legislative framework that clearly aimed to breakdown the traditional family. It removed the influence of the Church from marriage and divorce, making both a process of simple registration with the state. It granted the same legal rights to de facto marriages (couples living together) as it gave to legal marriages. The Code turned divorce from a luxury for the rich to something that was easy and affordable for all. The result was a huge increase in casual marriages and the highest rate of divorce in the world – three times higher than in France or Germany and twenty-six times higher than in England by 1926 – as the collapse of the Christian patriarchal order and the chaos of the revolutionary years loosened sexual morals along with family and communal ties.[1][2]

In the early years of Soviet power, family breakdown was so common among revolutionary activists that it almost constituted an occupational hazard. Casual relationships were practically the norm in Bolshevik circles during the Civil War, when any comrade could be sent at a moment’s notice to some distant sector of the front. Such relaxed attitudes remained common throughout the 1920s, as Party activists and their young emulators in the Komsomol (Communist Youth League) were taught to put their commitment to the proletariat before romantic love or family. Sexual promiscuity was more pronounced in the Party’s youthful ranks than among Soviet youth in general. Many Bolsheviks regarded sexual license as a form of liberation from bourgeois moral conventions and as a sign of ‘Soviet modernity’. Some even advocated promiscuity as a way to counteract the formation of coupling relationships that separated lovers from the collective and detracted from their loyalty to the Party.[3]

It was a commonplace that the Bolshevik made a bad husband and father because the demands of the Party took him away from the home. ‘We Communists don’t know our own families,’ remarked one Moscow Bolshevik. ‘You leave early and come home late. You seldom see your wife and almost never see your children.’ At Party congresses, where the issue was discussed throughout the 1920s, it was recognized that Bolsheviks were far more likely than non-Party husbands to abandon wives and families, and that this had much to do with the primacy of Party loyalties over sexual fidelity. But in fact the problem of absent wives and mothers was almost as acute in Party circles, as indeed it was in the broader circles of the Soviet intelligentsia, where most women were involved in the public sphere.15[4][5][6]

  1. ↑ Wendy Z. Goldman. (1993). Women, the State and Revolution: Soviet Family Policy and Social Life, 1917–1936. Cambridge. 107
  2. ↑ Natalia Lebina. 1999. Povsednevnaia zhizn’sovetskogo goroda: normy i anomalii, 1920–1930 gody. St Petersburg. 272.
  3. ↑ Igal Halfin. (2002). Intimacy in an Ideological Key: The Communist Case of the 1920s and 1930s’, in Language and Revolution: Making Modern Political Identities. London. 187–188.
  4. ↑ Orlando Figes. (2008). The Whisperers: Private Life in Stalin's Russia. Picador.
  5. ↑ Leon Trotsky. 1973. Problems of Everyday Life: Creating the Foundations of a New Society in Revolutionary Russia. London. 72
  6. ↑ Alex Inkeles & Raymond Augustine Bauer. (1959). The Soviet Citizen: Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society. Cambridge, Mass. 205.
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